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"There is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of
unequals."' l
I. INTRODUCTION
Our judicial system is guilty of creating inequality by providing
inadequate interpreting services for judicial proceedings. To ensure the
administration of justice, courts must appoint and permit the use of an
interpreter at trial when a party or a witness is unable to communicate or
understand the proceedings. 2 An interpreter is used to assist in the ques-
tioning of a non-English speaking person, to facilitate a non-English
speaking person's understanding of the proceedings, and to aid in com-
munication between individuals and attorneys.' These vital needs, how-
ever, are not sufficiently fulfilled by the United States legal system.4
A hypothetical situation illustrates the need for adequate interpret-
ing services. Suppose A, a Spanish-speaking individual, has a conversa-
tion with an English-speaking individual, B, concerning a drug deal.
They cannot directly communicate due to their language barrier, which
1. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (referring
to the inequity of subjecting a non-English speaking individual to participation in proceedings he
can not understand).
2. See Carlos A. Astiz, But They Don't Speak the Language, 25 JUDGES' J., 32, 33 (1986);
Williamson B.C. Chang & Manuel U. Araujo, Comment, Interpreters for the Defense: Due
Process for the Non-English-Speaking Defendant, 63 CAL. L. REV. 801, 805-06 (1975).
3. See Chang & Araujo, supra note 2, at 801-02.
4. Id. at 802.
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requires them to employ the services of C, a bilingual individual and a
friend of B, to act as an interpreter. A is later arrested and charged with
drug dealing. A's public defender only speaks English. This hypotheti-
cal raises the following dilemmas: How will A understand the judicial
proceedings against him? How will A testify on his own behalf if he so
chooses? How does the court determine whether A deserves to have a
court appointed interpreter? Does it matter whether A speaks any Eng-
lish at all? Does it matter whether A requests an interpreter? How will
A communicate with his attorney to aid in his defense at trial? If A were
entitled to an interpreter to aid his understanding of the proceedings and/
or to aid him in testifying, would A still be entitled to an interpreter if his
counsel happened to be bilingual?
In addition, problems arise from introducing B's account of A's
statements from their conversation. Are these statements inadmissible
because B only heard C's interpretation of what A said? Does it matter
that C is B's friend? What if C were A's friend; would that make a
difference? Does it matter whether C was charged as a co-conspirator in
this case? Would it matter if C were a police informant? The judicial
response to these questions is not settled or clear.
Congress and state legislatures have enacted rules to address the
problems of in-court interpretation. Rule 604 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides that "[a]n interpreter is subject to the provisions of
these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of
an oath or affirmation to make a true translation." The requirement of
the oath or affirmation, to attempt to assure that testimony is truthful, is
found in Rule 603.6 A person is qualified as an expert by Rule 702,
which requires knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in the
applicable field.7 Although these rules suggest that a qualified inter-
preter, under oath, may be utilized in judicial proceedings, the rules offer
little guidance on when the use of an interpreter is required or even
permitted.8 Rule 43(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,9 Rule
28(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,10 the Court Interpret-
5. FED. R. EvID. 604.
6. FED. R. EvID. 603.
7. FED. R. EvID. 702.
8. See FED. R. EvID. 706. Rule 706 provides that the court may appoint any expert of its
own selection or one agreed upon by the parties. The compensation of the expert is fixed by the
court and payable from funds provided by law in criminal cases and Fifth Amendment just
compensation proceedings and from the parties as directed by the court in other civil actions.
9. "The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix the interpreter's
reasonable compensation ... paid out of funds provided by law or by one or more of the parties as
the court may direct .... FED. R. Civ. P. 43(f).
10. "The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix the reasonable
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ers Act, 1 state statues,1 2 and case law 3 offer some guidance. The
uncertainty of existing law, however, allows for diverse treatment of the
issues of appointment and use of interpreters and the admission of testi-
mony recounting statements heard only as translated by an interpreter.14
The issue of admissibility of extrajudicial statements understood
only through an interpreter has received disparate treatment by the
courts. 5 State and federal judges alike are plagued by the issue of
whether and when to admit testimony regarding these out-of-court state-
ments. Courts disagree on such issues as how to test the admissibility of
these statements, 6 whether they constitute a hearsay exception or an
exemption,' 7 whether it matters who the interpreter was,' 8 whether it
matters if the interpreter testifies to authenticate his translation, 9 and
compensation of such interpreter... paid out of funds provided by law or by the government, as
the court may direct." FED. R. CRIM. P. 28.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988).
12. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 90.606 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-7 (Michie 1978); N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 380-90 (McKinney 1992).
13. E.g., United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
14. See infra part III.B.-D.
15. See infra part III.B. & C.
16. Compare United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 107 (1992) (holding an interpreter should be treated as a language conduit or as an agent of
both parties, removing the hearsay problems which prevent the admission of statements
understood only through an interpreter) and State v. Felton, 412 S.E.2d 344, 355 (N.C. 1992)
(finding an interpreter is presumed to be the agent of an individual who accepts the benefit of the
proffered translation, even if the interpreter was selected by a law enforcement officer) with State
v. Letterman, 616 P.2d 505, 508 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), aft'd, 627 P.2d 484 (Or. 1981) (finding an
extrajudicial statement understood only through an interpreter to be admissible based on the
necessity of the use of the testimony and the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness present
in the case).
17. Compare Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527 (basing admissibility on the hearsay exemption in
Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), (E), due to agency) with Letterman, 616 P.2d at 508 (basing admissibility
on the hearsay exception in Rule 803(24), due to the necessity of the use of the testimony and the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness).
18. Compare United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding testimony
on extrajudicial statements understood only through an interpreter to be admissible as not hearsay,
notwithstanding that the interpreter was an employee of the government) with People v. Romero,
581 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (N.Y. 1991) (finding an officer's testimony of a defendant's extrajudicial
statement understood only through an interpreter not admissible under the agency theory, where
the interpreter was a paid informant whose remuneration depended upon the prosecutability of the
case against the defendant).
19. Compare People v. Bartree, 566 N.E.2d 855, 857-58 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991) (requiring the
interpreter to be called to verify the accuracy of her translation before the officer's testimony on
the extrajudicial statements of the defendant made through the interpreter would be admissible)
and United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 860 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985),
and cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908 (1987) (finding testimony on an extrajudicial statement understood
only through an interpreter is presumed admissible with the interpreter acting only as a dual agent
of the parties even where the interpreter does not testify to the accuracy of his/her translation) with
Romero, 581 N.E.2d at 1051-52 (finding testimony on the defendant's extrajudicial statement
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whether it is a question of admissibility or of weight of the evidence.2"
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 21
Statements found to be hearsay are inadmissible at trial unless they fall
within an exemption or exception provided by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority, or by an Act of Congress.22 The hearsay rule excludes
statements, based on concerns of unreliability, where the declarant was
not under oath, there was no opportunity for the jury to observe the
demeanor of the declarant, and there was no opportunity for the party
the statement was made against to contemporaneously cross-examine the
declarant.23
Nevertheless, hearsay statements should be admitted, as necessary,
when there is no other evidence that is more probative on the particular
24 T diissue. To admit hearsay statements based on necessity, there also must
exist circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, particularly in a case
where an interpreter testifies to the accuracy of an interpretation. 2  Tes-
timony based on statements only understood through an interpreter that
would fall within an exception or an exemption if the declarant and the
witness spoke the same language should be admitted even though it (the
testimony of B regarding what C interpreted A's statement to be) does
not fall within a traditional exception to the hearsay rule. The issue of
trustworthiness should be determined by the jury weighing the credibil-
made through an interpreter was inadmissible even though the interpreter testified, where the
interpreter's credibility was at issue).
20. Compare United States v. Felix-Jerez, 667 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating the
agency-language conduit theory was inapplicable where the interpreter was not named or chosen
by the defendant to act as his agent and there was an obvious conflict of interest between the
defendant and the interpreter, a prison guard) with United States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
1985) (finding the testimony of a government agent based on notes he took during an interview
with the defendant, understood by the government agent only through an interpreter, was
admissible, stating that any inaccuracies went toward the evaluation of credibility rather than
admissibility).
21. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
22. FED. R. EvID. 802.
23. George V. Matlock, Note, Admissibility of Third-Party Testimony on Out-of-Court
Statements Made to a Witness Through an Interpreter - Chao v. State, 478 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1985),
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 371, 372 (1986); see Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 184 (1948); see also Ted Finman,
Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 682, 684 (1962) (litigants should have an opportunity to cross-examine individuals that the
court is asked to rely upon because cross-examination is "the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth").





ity of the translation.2 6 Many courts are reluctant to support this inter-
pretation of the hearsay rule.27 Commentators have argued that
admitting testimony recounting an extrajudicial interpretation may
undermine the basic hearsay rule functions of minimizing the risk of
mistakes in memory and perception.28 Yet in the interest of equity and
justice, it is unfair to allow a language barrier to disadvantage individu-
als otherwise allowed to admit certain extrajudicial statements into
evidence.
This Comment will first examine the issues of whether there is or
should be a right to an interpreter. Second, this Comment examines the
federal treatment of this issue under the Court Interpreters Act, the quali-
fications for an interpreter, the reasons for the lack of qualified interpret-
ers, and the problems arising from in-court interpreters. Finally, this
Comment examines the various theories courts apply when considering
whether and when to admit out-of-court statements made through inter-
preters. This Comment argues that the agency theory is a plausible
theory.
II. IN-COURT INTERPRETATION
A. The Right to an Interpreter in Judicial Proceedings
Prior to 1970, the appointment of an interpreter in criminal pro-
ceedings was entirely within a court's discretion.29 In 1970, however,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States ex rel Negron v.
New York3" held that the Confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment,
26. United States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1985).
27. See, e.g., Garcia v. State, 68 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Neb. 1955); People v. Romero, 581
N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (N.Y. 1991); State v. Huynh, 742 P.2d 160, 167-68 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
28. Michelle Gorman, Case Comment, Evidence: Testimony Recounting A Translated
Conversation Not Hearsay if Implied Agency Exists, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1067, 1067, 1072 (1985);
see also John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 741, 743-44 (1961); Morgan, supra note 23, at 218.
29. Cervantes v. Cox, 350 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1965) (finding no constitutional right to the
assistance of court-appointed counsel, although under extreme circumstances the inability to
communicate with counsel may deny a party the right to effective representation, and therefore,
may result in an involuntary or unknowing plea); United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 902-03
(2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (holding the right to a court-appointed interpreter could
not be stronger than the right to a court-appointed counsel, which is only available to indigents;
thus, court's failure to appoint an interpreter not reversible error where the individual could afford
and communicate with counsel); see also Chang & Araujo, supra note 2, at 813-14 (the right to
confrontation was usually satisfied as long as the defendant's counsel understood English, even if
counsel could not communicate with his client); cf. United States v. Coronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d
1284 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985) (no abuse of discretion in denying defendant's
motion to have the entire voir dire proceeding translated into Spanish where the defendant had
lived and worked in the United States for at least seven years and had an interpreter seated with
him at the defense table throughout the proceeding).
30. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
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applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause, required that non-English speaking defendants be informed
of their right to simultaneous interpretation of proceedings at the govern-
ment's expense. 31 The court believed the defendant would otherwise be
unable to assist his counsel in the effective cross-examination of wit-
nesses testifying against him. 32 The court based its finding on cases
holding that the constitutional guarantees of the right to be heard, to
know the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted by
witnesses who are testifying against him are meaningless and vain if the
accused is unable to understand the proceedings.33
Following the reasoning of Negron, Congress enacted the Court
Interpreters Act in 1978.34 The Act required United States District
Court officers to employ competent interpreters in criminal or civil
actions initiated by the government when a party or witness speaks only
or primarily in a language other than English, is hearing impaired, or is
physically unable to speak at an audible level .3  A request by the party
is not necessary because the Court Interpreters Act permitted the court to
appoint an interpreter on its own motion.36 The Act does not require
that an individual be incapable of speaking any English but rather that
the witness or party be unable to comprehend the proceedings or com-
municate with counsel or the presiding judicial officer.37 In addition, the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts must
determine the qualifications of those who may serve as certified inter-
preters, must provide guidelines to courts for the selection of its own
qualified interpreters where there are no certified interpreters available,
and must maintain a list of all certified and otherwise qualified interpret-
ers to ensure that the highest standards of accuracy are maintained in all
judicial proceedings.38
31. Id. at 389; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding indigent criminal
defendants have the fundamental right to have assistance of counsel at trial); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (finding the right to court-appointed counsel exists where the
defendant could possibly be incarcerated); cf. State v. Kounelis, 609 A.2d 1310 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992) (illustrating that this reasoning has not been abandoned and holding the court's
failure to appoint an interpreter for a Greek-speaking defendant, who could not afford an
interpreter, to be reversible error because it violated his federal and state constitutional rights to
confrontation and effective assistance of counsel).
32. Negron, 434 F.2d at 389-90; see Chang & Araujo, supra note 2, at 813.
33. E.g., Terry v. State, 105 So. 386 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925).
34. 28 U.S.C § 1827 (1988).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (1988); see also State in re R.R., 398 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1979) (listing
case law from several states consistent with this provision).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (1988); see Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565
(11 th Cir. 1989); United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980); Hrubec v. United
States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (1988).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b) (1988); cf. BILL PiA-r, ZONLY ENGLISH?: LAW AND LANGUAGE
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Although the Act provides guidelines, it has not been effective in
providing qualified interpreters to non-English speaking individuals. In
most federal39 and state40 judicial proceedings, the trial judge still has
wide discretion in the determination of the need to appoint an inter-
preter. The Court Interpreters Act only limits this discretion by requir-
ing that the court inquire whether the failure to have an interpreter
throughout the proceedings would inhibit a non-English speaking indi-
vidual's comprehension of the proceedings and communication with his
counsel.4" This limit, however, is minimal because after the inquiry the
court may appoint or refuse to appoint an interpreter within its own dis-
cretion. The court's decision not to appoint an interpreter, in accordance
with the Court Interpreters Act or the applicable state statute, will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.42
Appellate courts often decide whether the failure to obtain an inter-
preter is reversible error by determining whether the outcome of the case
was affected rather than whether the party's constitutional right to an
interpreter was violated. In 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the defendant's exercise of his rights to
testify and to articulate his defense were not violated by the failure to
provide an interpreter because his inability to understand English did not
affect the verdict.4 3 The verdict was based on the testimony of others -
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 83, 85 (1990) (some states maintain listings of certified
interpreters, and in the absence of certified interpreters, the trial judge must be satisfied that the
interpreter demonstrates sufficient education, training, and experience to render accurate and
competent translations).
39. E.g., United States v. Coronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d 1284, 1291 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 819 (1985); United States v. Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974); United States v. Sosa,
379 F.2d 525 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967); Hardin v. United States, 324 F.2d 553
(5th Cir. 1963); Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1962); Pietrzak v. United
States, 188 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1951); cf. United States v.
Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 68 (3d Cir.) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the witness's wife to act as his interpreter, where the trial court fully examined her ability
to interpret his mumbling and her possible motives to misinterpret), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936,
reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1048 (1972).
40. Watson v. State, 190 So. 2d 161, 167 (Fla. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967);
Monte v. State, 443 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
41. United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980); Pietrzak, 188 F.2d at 420;
see Salsedo, 607 F.2d at 320 (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it held a
thorough hearing with the government witness, without the presence of the jury, to determine if it
was necessary to appoint an interpreter).
42. Coronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d at 1291; Sosa, 379 F.2d at 527; Monte, 443 So. 2d at 341;
Kaelin v. State, 410 So. 2d 1355, 1357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); People v. Starling, 315 N.E.2d 163
(111. App. Ct. 1974); State in re R.R., 398 A.2d 76, (N.J. 1979); see also State v. Kounelis, 609
A.2d 1310, 1314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
43. United States v. Maniego, 710 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1983).
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not of the defendant. 44 But, the court made no mention of whether the
lack of interpretation could have interfered with effective cross-exami-
nation. This is not fair to a defendant, such as A, who may not be able to
understand the proceedings or understand the testimony of others in
order to inform his counsel of false or misleading statements. A's right
to a fair trial should not be diminished merely because he speaks a lan-
guage other than English. This is particularly problematic in areas, such
as major cities, where an inability to comprehend and speak English is
not a rare occurrence.
In addition, courts have held that the failure to appoint an inter-
preter is not reversible error if the party has validly and expressly
waived his right to an interpreter or if other circumstances existed that
enabled him to comprehend the proceedings. a5 Similarly, the reviewing
court is unlikely to find the proceeding was fundamentally unfair due to
an inadequate translation, absent a contemporaneous objection. 6 In
Valladares v. United States, 7 the Eleventh Circuit stated that
[o]nly if the defendant makes any difficulty with the interpreter
known to the court can the judge take corrective measures. To allow
a defendant to remain silent throughout the trial and then, upon being
found guilty, to assert a claim of inadequate translation would be an
open invitation to abuse.4a
In addition, courts usually will not appoint an interpreter unless one
is requested.49 In Suarez v. United States,"° the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the failure to appoint an interpreter for a defendant
who spoke primarily Spanish was not an abuse of discretion because the
defendant could speak some English and the issue was being raised on
44. Id.
45. Monte, 443 So. 2d at 342; Kounelis, 609 A.2d at 1314; see also United States v. Miller,
806 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the defense counsel cannot claim that the trial court
erred in appointing an interpreter without qualifying her as an expert, as required by Rule 604 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, if the defense counsel expressly and affirmatively consented in the
trial court to the appointment of the interpreter); Chang & Araujo, supra note 2, at 802, 818 (citing
cases that have held the failure to request an interpreter constitutes waiver of the right).
46. Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564 (11 th Cir. 1989).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1566; see also Miller, 806 F.2d at 223 (holding failure to qualify interpreter as an
expert, as required by Rule 604 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is not plain error and therefore
will not be reversed in the absence of a contemporaneous objection); Suarez v. United States, 309
F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint
an interpreter, but also mentioning that the defense raised this issue for the first time on appeal);
Kounelis, 609 A.2d at 1314 (holding the constitutional right of an indigent non-English speaking
defendant is not waived by his mere acquiescence or nonverbal conduct).
49. Suarez, 309 F.2d at 709.
50. 309 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1962).
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appeal for the first time. 51 Many courts find the lack of an interpreter or
the inadequate provision of an interpreter is not reversible error where
the individual has only a superficial understanding of English or the
inadequacies of the interpretation are not significant in the outcome of
the case.52 This position ignores the suggestion by Negron and the
Court Interpreters Act that a constitutional or statutory right to an inter-
preter exists.53 Other courts have held that an individual's rights to
understand the proceedings, confront his accusers, and waive his rights
knowingly and intelligently are undermined by the absence of an inter-
preter.54 One court found a trial judge's refusal and failure to inquire
whether an interpreter was needed was a violation of a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation and the defendant's right to due pro-
cess of law."
One's ability to converse in English does not necessarily meant that
one can sufficiently understand judicial proceedings consisting of
sophisticated legal terminology. The constitutional right to an inter-
preter alluded to in Negron appears to be more illusory than real,
because of the deference a court's determination of this issue is granted
by appellate courts. A's understanding of English may be so limited that
he cannot understand the complexities of the legal proceeding. Never-
theless, because he can form comprehensible phrases and sentences in
English, an appellate court will find sufficient support of a trial judge's
discretionary decision to forgo the appointment of an interpreter. In
51. Id. at 712 (although the prosecutor raised the issue of an interpreter twice, the defense
counsel failed to raise the issue at trial).
52. United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994
(1981); State v. Topete, 380 N.W.2d 635 (Neb. 1986) (holding that failure to appoint an
interpreter was not an abuse of discretion where judges or witnesses overhear the person speak in
English); PiATr, supra note 38, at 83-84; see United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1140 (11 th
Cir. 1988) (finding a single interpreter sufficient to aid three defendants during trial); United
States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469 (9th Cir.) (holding defendants' ability to understand the proceedings
and communicate with counsel was not impaired when several times, the court borrowed the
defendants' interpreter to assist a witness in testifying when the defendant had a second court
interpreter at the defense table, the borrowed interpreter used a microphone once, no objection
was made at trial, and no evidence was submitted at the supplemental hearing to indicate that the
defendants did not actually understand any portion of the trial), cert. denied sub nom. Dong Joon
Ahn v. United States, 479 U.S. 937 (1986).
53. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1985) (relying on United States ex
rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970) and on Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2d
Cir. 1984), which held that a hearing for admission into the United States is "of no value when the
alien and the judge are not understood"). In this case the court held that the defendant understood
and spoke English, based on extensive proof; Id. See also Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707 F.
Supp. 504, 507 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
55. Giraldo-Rincon, 707 F. Supp. at 507 (finding failure to inquire regarding the need for an
interpreter a violation of the fundamental fairness required by the due process clause and requiring
a new trial, regardless of any probability of guilt).
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addition, A may have been able to live in an English-speaking commu-
nity and hold a job that requires him to speak in English yet have such a
superficial understanding of the English language and its idiosyncratic
idioms that he cannot keep up with the pace and difficulty of a legal
proceeding. This type of individual will be wrongfully denied the aid of
an interpreter.
Individuals who are physically incapable of speaking and those
who cannot speak English could possibly be deprived of due process and
equal protection by this wide discretion, in violation of the Sixth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which assure these rights to English-speaking individuals. 6 A's inabil-
ity to speak English does not justify affording him less protection of his
constitutional rights than an English-speaking individual.
Courts disagree of whether the right to an interpreter exists only in
criminal proceedings or whether it also extends to civil and administra-
tive proceedings. The courts' extension of the right to an interpreter has
been inconsistent, with some courts holding that there is no constitu-
tional right to an interpreter in civil proceedings57 and other courts
requiring full and continuous interpretation of the entire proceedings in
civil cases. 8 Some courts have held that there is no constitutional right
to an interpreter in administrative proceedings.5 1 Yet others have fol-
lowed the principles of fairness and due process applied in criminal
cases and hold there is a right to an interpreter during administrative
proceedings.6' The diverse treatment of the issue of when the right to an
interpreter exists is accounted for, to some degree, by the varying state
constitutions and statutes. 61
56. See United States v. Maniego, 710 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding the court did not
err in failing to appoint an interpreter where the defendant's understanding of the proceedings did
not affect the verdict); United States v. Sosa, 379 F.2d 525, 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
845 (1967) (holding the court did not err in failing to appoint an interpreter where the judge
understood the defendant's language); Debra S. Groisser, A Right to Translation Assistance in
Administrative Proceedings, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 469, 495 (1981); see also United
States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 902 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (holding the right to
a court-appointed interpreter could not be stronger than the right to a court-appointed counsel,
which is only available to indigents; thus the court's failure to appoint an interpreter not reversible
error where the individual can afford and communicate with counsel); supra notes 31-33, 49-55
and accompanying text.
57. E.g., Jara v. Municipal Court, 578 P.2d 94, 96-97 (Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067
(1979); see PIATr, supra note 38, at 80.
58. E.g., Gardiana v. Small Claims Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
59. E.g., Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Guerrero v.
Swoap, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974).
60. See Kropiwka v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 275 N.W.2d 881
(Wis.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852 (1979); see also Groisser, supra note 56, at 495.
61. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; FLA. STAT. ch. 90.606 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-7
(Michie 1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 380-390 (Consol. 1992).
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B. Inadequate Qualification Standards for Interpreters
The appointment of an interpreter does not necessarily solve the
problems of non-English speaking and linguistically disabled individu-
als. The remaining problems include the lack of minimum standards for
qualification,62 the issue of what degree accuracy of translation is guar-
anteed,6 3 the conflict regarding what role the interpreter should adopt,'
and the difficulties inherent in interpreting from one language to
another.65 These impediments to comprehending the proceedings can
deprive individuals of the right to a fair trial.
An ideal court interpreter would have an education that included at
least two years of college education in two or more languages, would be
familiar with professional and technical terminology, particularly legal
terms, and would be knowledgeable of the phrases and slang used in the
area by those speaking the particular language.66 But without standards
to measure qualifications, there is no clearly defined pool of competent
interpreters.67 The Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, attempting to comply with the Court Interpreters Act,
instituted a broad scale study, employing some of the most qualified and
esteemed experts, to develop an effective test for certifying interpret-
ers.68 The tests were created to ensure that interpreters would have a
good vocabulary in both languages, strong interpreting skills, and an
ability to interpret with precision the style and tone of the language used
in court.69 The tests devised have been challenged and upheld as reason-
able and not beyond the powers provided under the Court Interpreters
Act.7" These efforts have generated a pool of interpreters, but their
effectiveness remains questionable.
A study in the mid-1980s, supported by the United States Depart-
ment of Justice, found that the pool of interpreters is mostly Spanish-
English speaking, not often employed by the courts, and unevenly dis-
tributed geographically .7  Researchers also found that there are very
62. See infra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 86-90, 97-111 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 112-131 and accompanying text.
66. Astiz, supra note 2, at 35; see also Alexandre Rainof, How to Best Use an Interpreter in
Court, CAL. ST. B., MAY 1980, at 196, 198.
67. Astiz, supra note 2, at 35.
68. Seltzer v. Foley, 502 F. Supp. 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
69. Id. at 604-08.
70. Id. at 608.
71. Astiz, supra note 2, at 35. See PIATr, supra note 38, at 92-93 (reporting that as of 1986,
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts had spent $1,000,000 to develop and administer
interpretation certification tests and had administered the Spanish interpretation test more than
7,000 times but had only certified 292 interpreters).
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few institutions of higher education that extensively train and certify
interpreters and that agencies providing interpreting services lack quality
control mechanisms.72 Interpreters and criminal justice administrators
admitted that they fail to use the large pool of competent interpreters that
exists within international organizations and certain government
agencies.73
The inability to find and employ qualified, if not certified, interpret-
ers has led to the widespread use of unqualified and incompetent indi-
viduals as interpreters. In 1985, a New Jersey Task force reported that
state and municipal court judges had allowed friends, neighbors, and
young children of litigants to interpret court proceedings. 74 One of the
greatest misconceptions is that if a person is bilingual he is capable of
interpreting judicial proceedings; this is not true, especially considering
the frequent use of legal terms uncommon to everyday communica-
tion.75 The use of janitors, secretaries of judges, clerks of libraries, local
residents, witness' friends and relatives, and other unqualified individu-
als as interpreters results in inadequate translations.76 Yet the task force
often found the civil servants who were official interpreters to be less
competent than the lay interpreters.77 In more than half of the 142 cases
studied, interpretation was so deficient that it had a "potential negative
effect on the outcome of the proceeding or interfered substantially with
one's understanding of the proceeding. ' 78 Among the cases studied, at
least one mistrial and three appeals resulted from misinterpretation.79
Supplying inadequate interpreters does not promote equality of treat-
ment between people with linguistic disabilities or non-English speaking
individuals and people who are capable of effectively communicating in
the English language. In fact, these interpreters may possess such inade-
72. Astiz, supra note 2, at 35.
73. Id. at 56. These organizations and government agencies are located in areas such as New
York City and Washington, D.C., including the United Nations, the World Bank, the Organization
of American States, the United States Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the National Security Agency.
74. Bruce S. Rosen, N.J. Study Charges Interpreters Impede Justice, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 26,
1985, at 8 (quoting Professor W. Marshall Prettyman, Acting Director of Clinical Services at
Seton Hall University School of Law, who said that in some state courts interpreters are provided,
but it is not unusual for young children to translate for their parents in housing cases).
75. Seltzer v. Foley, 502 F. Supp. 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also PIAT-r, supra note 38, at
79 (offering an example based on personal knowledge to support the formal findings that being
bilingual does not make a person qualified to be a court interpreter).
76. Seltzer, 502 F. Supp. at 607; see also Charles M. Grabau & David-Ross Williamson,
Language Barriers in Our Trial Courts: The Use of Court Interpreters in Massachusetts, 70
MAss. L. REV. 108, 110 (1985); PIArr, supra note 38, at 85-86.





quate interpretation skills that the individual seeking such services may
be more disadvantaged than if no interpreter were provided at all.
Furthermore, a party may choose to hire an interpreter, but in a case
where the Act applies, that party must use a court appointed interpreter
while testifying.80 This requirement is not to burden the court with
extraneous costs, but to insure an accurate and unbiased translation.8'
But a hired interpreter may provide a more accurate interpretation,
because one who hires an interpreter likely will require assurance that
the interpreter is sufficiently qualified.
Many courts allow, or even require, a bilingual defense attorney to
serve as the interpreter for his non-English speaking or linguistically dis-
abled client.82 A few cases have found that the dual role of advocate and
translator cannot possibly satisfy the Confrontation Clause and Due Pro-
cess Clause concerns.83 The argument against the use of counsel as
interpreter is based on the belief that this arrangement interferes with the
traditional view of the attorney's duty of zealous advocacy.84 This
arrangement could result in the failure to interpret the proceedings as
required by law, ineffective assistance of counsel, or both, thereby, vio-
lating constitutional guarantees.85 The attorney with such a dual role
would have the almost impossible task of interpreting all of the proceed-
ings completely and accurately for his client, while also formulating and
planning his trial strategies. In one instance, it may be helpful for a
defendant, like A, to be able to freely communicate with his counsel.
Yet if the appointment of bilingual counsel is intended to replace rather
than complement an interpreter, A's defense may suffer significantly.
Requiring the attorney to take on both roles of counsel and interpreter
may result in the failure of the attorney to represent A to the best of his
ability. This denial of due process of law for individuals requiring the
services of an interpreter can be equated with the inequality of treatment
resulting from the failure to provide an interpreter at all or perhaps even
the failure to provide an attorney. In some cases, mandating that the
80. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971
(1984).
81. Id at 1232.
82. Bill Piatt, Attorney as Interpreter: A Return to Babble, 20 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1990); see
Chang & Araujo, supra note 2, at 822-23; see also People v. Sepulveda, 302 N.W.2d 256, 257
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.W.2d 283 (Mich. 1981) (finding the court
has wide discretion in deciding whether to appoint an interpreter; failure to appoint one was not an
abuse of discretion where counsel was bilingual and no request was made at the trial); Baltierra v.
State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 559 n.1 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (stating appointed bilingual counsel
provides the ability to communicate with the client but does not satisfy the right of confrontation).
83. Id.
84. Piatt, supra note 82, at 10.
85. Id.
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attorney perform both jobs could cause the individual to be in a less
favorable position than if he had been represented by a monolingual
counsel.
C. The Right to a Competent and Accurate Interpretation
Even where the court does find that the right to an interpreter
exists, the right is meaningless unless it actually includes the right to a
competent and accurate interpretation. Otherwise, the situation is
equivalent to not providing an interpreter at all.86 Most courts have
instituted the legislative intent of the Court Interpreters Act, which
requires continuous word for word translation of everything relating to
the trial that a defendant conversant in the English language would be
privy to hear.87 This requirement is to ensure that "the quality of trans-
lation does not fall below a constitutionally permissible threshold."88
These courts have held that interpreters should not summarize or embel-
lish when translating live testimony; but defendants have no constitu-
tional right to flawless, word for word translations.89 Therefore, despite
innocent mistakes, improper embellishments, deliberate misinterpreta-
tions, or errors in translation, trial will be found to be fundamentally fair
as long as the outcome of the case was not prejudiced.90
Courts also have held that the Court Interpreters Act does not man-
date the appointment of individual interpreters where more than one
party is entitled to an interpreter. 9' But a separate interpreter should be
provided for each party if the court finds the purposes of the Act cannot
86. Astiz, supra note 2, at 33.
87. United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1309 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Panchal v.
United States, 498 U.S. 986 (1990); see United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Diaz Berrios, 441 F.2d 1125, 1127 (2d Cir. 1971); H.R. REP. No. 1687,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4658-59 (requiring and
defining simultaneous, continuous translation); see also United States v. Huang, 960 F.2d 1128,
1135-36 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Gomez, 908 F.2d 809, 811 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1035 (1991) (holding that occasional lapses from continuous word for word translation,
such as embellishing or summarizing live testimony, will not render the trial fundamentally
unfair).
88. Gomez, 908 F.2d at 811; accord Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1309; see also Valladares v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989).
89. Gomez, 908 F.2d at 811 (citing Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1309, for the proposition that
occasional lapses from word for word translation will not render the trial fundamentally unfair as
long as the evidence against the defendant in all other respects was overwhelming and an
interpreter included what he felt the witness meant to say in an interpretation of the testimony);
accord Huang, 960 F.2d at 1135-36; Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1565-66.
90. Gomez, 908 F.2d at 811.
91. United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134 (11 th Cir. 1988); see also Chavira Gonzales v.
United States, 314 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1963). The court held that the failure to appoint a
separate interpreter was not reversible error in a multi-defendant case where an interpreter was
present and available. Further, the court found that at the point of the case in which the defendant
felt that her defense was crucial, the lack of a separate interpreter was inconsequential.
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be met using a single interpreter.92 In addition, the Act does not require
the appointment of a second interpreter when the testimony of witnesses
must be translated and the party needs an interpreter to facilitate com-
munication with his attorney.93 A second interpreter, however, would be
required if the client were precluded from communicating with his coun-
sel through an interpreter when necessary, such as during liberally
granted recesses.94 Courts are less sensitive to the need of an interpreter
to aid in the effective communication between a client and his counsel
than they are to the need of an interpreter to aid a witness or party in
testifying. 95 Courts tend to find an individual's right to an interpreter is
not violated by the failure to provide an interpreter to facilitate commu-
nication, as long as there was some aided discussion permitted at some
point in time. The significance of attorney-client communication during
trial should not be undervalued. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial,
regardless of the outcome. Yet all of the interpretations of the Court
Interpreters Act support the view that a violation of the rules of interpre-
tation will not be reversible error because of fundamental unfairness,
unless the outcome of the trial is prejudiced.96
The applicable legal definition of an interpreter is a person sworn at
trial to interpret, which is "to translate orally from one tongue to
another."97 To clarify the intended meaning of this term, Judge Roettger
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
expressly replaced the term "interpreter" with "translator," because the
individual is actually translating the spoken or written word from one
language to another.9 When interpreting judicial proceedings, the
emphasis is on accuracy and is not "interpretive," - attempting to
account for cultural or educational inadequacies of the defendant or wit-
ness.99 For example, A does not deserve more aid in testifying or in
92. United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1991); see Valladares, 871 F.2d
at 1566; United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dong Joon Ahn
v. United States, 479 U.S. 937 (1986).
93. Bennett, 848 F.2d at 1141; see Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1311 n.8; Lim, 794 F.2d at 471; PiArr,
supra note 38, at 89.
94. Bennett, 848 F.2d at 1141; see Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1311 n.8; Lim, 794 F.2d at 471.
95. Chang & Araujo, supra note 2, at 803-04.
96. See supra note 89.
97. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 817-18 (6th ed. 1990); see also Alan Crouch, Interpreters,
Translators and Legal Services: Toward a Better Understanding, 55 L. INST. J. 264 (1981)
(Interpreting and translating are distinguished by describing the former as being primarily
concerned with the spoken word, and the latter being primarily concerned with the written word;
but neither requires departing in any way from what is being said. The primary concern is to
render accurately the entire sense of what is being conveyed without adding to or detracting from
it.).
98. United States v. Kramer, 741 F. Supp. 893, 894 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
99. Astiz, supra note 2, at 34.
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understanding the proceedings than an individual who is unintelligent or
who may have the same cultural inadequacies but can speak and under-
stand English.
This seems logical, yet many interpreters and judges do not agree
that an interpreter's role is merely to provide continuous word for word
translation of everything relating to the trial that a defendant conversant
in the English language would be privy to hear. A study conducted with
the support of the National Institute of Justice disclosed that many
judges, administrators, and attorneys expect the interpreter to take an
"adaption role" and become a liaison between them and the individual
requiring interpretation.'0° Interpreters also indicated they considered it
part of their duty to simplify and outline the court proceedings for indi-
viduals they believe would not understand an accurate translation or the
proceedings themselves.' °' This view of the role of an interpreter is not
supported by the rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. It also does not it fulfill the
requirement of continuous word for word translation intended by the
Court Interpreters Act. 102
First, the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protec-
tion require interpretation to put the individual in the same position as if
he were able to converse in English. 0 3 Interpretation should not adjust
for education, ability to understand the proceedings, and knowledge of
what is transpiring because this would reverse the inequity by placing
those requiring interpreters in a better position than those who do not.'°4
Second, the inadequate recruiting process and the knowledge that most
challenges to an interpreter's performance come from the defense lead
interpreters to employ this adaptation role.' 05 Their desire is to please
the non-English speaking or linguistically disabled individual, which
disregards the duty of the interpreter to provide an accurate translation to
ensure equality of treatment. Furthermore, it ignores the legislative
intent of the Court Interpreters Act and the case law regarding interpret-
ers in judicial proceedings, which require continuous and accurate
translations. 10 6
Another method for assuring the accuracy of translation is the
requirement that the interpreter be sworn by oath or affirmation to make
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 31-33, 43-44, 52-55, 56 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
104. Astiz, supra note 2, at 34-35; see Rainof, supra note 66, at 198.
105. Astiz, supra note 2, at 35.




a true translation. °7 Failure to administer the oath does not constitute
plain error, even where the translated testimony was crucial to the
case. 0 8 Therefore, absent an objection, this error will not compel rever-
sal. Furthermore, in United States v. Kramer,'o9 the court held that fail-
ure to administer an oath or affirmation to make a true translation at a
deposition did not constitute plain error."t 0 If a witness must take an
oath when testifying, then plain error should be found when an inter-
preter fails to take an oath when interpreting a witness's testimony. In
Kramer, the court concluded that translation at a deposition could be
ratified by the trial judge, upon inquiry, at an evidentiary hearing prior to
the allegedly infirm testimony being offered at trial and subsequent to
administering of an oath or affirmation of the interpreter to tell the
truth.' Again, this would be impermissible if a witness failed to take
an oath at the deposition. Therefore, an exception should not be made
for an interpreter.
D. Difficulties Encountered in Interpreting
Many other obstacles hinder accurate and precise translations. An
interpreter may be fluent in a foreign language without knowing all of
the dialectal differences within that language." 2  In one case, the court
pointed out that it hires interpreters only after they pass a rigorous exam,
107. FED, R. EvIo. 603, 604; e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 90.606(3) (1991).
108. United States v. Perez, 651 F.2d 268, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Rule 52(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which only permits appellate notice of plain errors or
defects not objected to at trial if they affect substantial rights).
109. 741 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
110. Id. at 894.
111. Id. at 895. The court placed substantial emphasis on the extensive qualifications
possessed by the interpreters, Id. The court also proposed two other bases for admitting the
deposition. The court relied on United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (11 th Cir. 1985) to suggest
that the translations could have been admissible based on what the translator heard at the scene
under Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Present Sense Impression hearsay
exception. Kramer, 741 F. Supp. at 896. The court also proposed Rule 803(24) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Other Exceptions hearsay exception, as a basis for admitting the
deposition, despite the failure to swear in the interpreter. Id. Under this exception, the evidence
could be admitted if the court determines that the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact, it is more probative on the issue for which it is offered than any other evidence the proponent
can procure through any reasonable efforts, and the general purposes of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the interests of justice would be served by the admission of the statement into
evidence. FED. R. EvID. 803(24). The statement must also be made known to adverse parties
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, as
was done here. Kramer, 741 F. Supp. at 896.
112. Rainof, supra note 66, at 196 (illustrating the difficulty of translating languages with
many dialectal variations, by listing the nineteen major dialects of Spanish and examples of the
various minor variations); cf. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 990 (1969) (admitting testimony on a translation where the officer spoke idiomatic New
Mexican Spanish, the declarant addressed an assembly of Spanish-speaking New Mexicans in
"pure" Spanish and the statement was not being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted).
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but that the test does not account for dialectal differences.,1 3 In that
case, the Spanish-speaking plaintiff described the velocity of a train's
stop as a "crash," but the interpreter translated it as a "bump."' 1 4 A
Spanish-speaking juror discovered the error and reported it in a private
meeting with the judge, the interpreter, the court reporter, and coun-
sel. " 5 After the meeting, the plaintiff was recalled to clarify her testi-
mony. 16 The juror was instructed to rely only on the interpreter's
translations, despite his own knowledge of the foreign language." 7
However, the judge did inform the juror that any large discrepancies
should be brought to the court's attention." 8 This is consistent with the
approach taken by many courts to deal with minor errors in translation
as insignificant and harmless error."t 9
The interpreter may also have trouble accurately translating certain
words that have multiple meanings, particularly if he is unaware of the
context within which the statement is being made or if the witness uses
idiomatic expressions. 2 ° For example, a question arose in one case
regarding whether the witness had said that a man had forced his affec-
tions on a woman or whether the man had physically forced himself
upon a woman. 12' Another error, mentioned in the dissent, was that the
arresting officer gave the arrestee an improper Miranda warning by stat-
ing that an attorney would be "furnished," as in to "fill a room with
furniture," rather than as in to be "provided."' t2 2 These errors were not
fatal in this case. The court stated the term "force" has the same conno-
tation in English as in Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese, and the defend-
ant admitted he understood what his rights were. 123 Yet an error such as
the one discounted by this court could affect the outcome of the case in
states where the former definition is viewed as a non-criminal act of
seduction and the latter is considered the criminal act of rape.1 24
Complications arise in deciding how to handle the possibility of
differences in translations, including requiring a court reporter to take
down what is said in a foreign language.125 Some languages, such as the
113. Santana v. New York City Transit Auth., 505 N.Y.S.2d 775, 780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
114. Id. at 777-78.
115. Id. at 777.
116. Id. at 780.
117. Id. at 779-80.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
120. Rainof, supra note 66, at 197.
121. People v. Gutierrez, 187 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
122. Id. at 135.
123. Id. at 131, 135-36.
124. Although this difference is noted, no comment is intended on whether this difference
should matter in determining whether an individual's act was rape.
125. Gutierrez, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
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various Asian languages, have entirely different alphabets, making it
impossible for court reporters to even try to write out the statements
phonetically.'2 6 One suggestion is for the witness to write down all of
his own statements for the record.' 27 But this is time consuming and
impractical, particularly during long periods of questioning. 28 Another
possibility is for counsel to insist that testimony be tape recorded. 129
Providing word for word translations is also difficult due to com-
plex, long sentences, and syntax problems.' 3  Finally, English pronouns
that are gender neutral may cause an error in translation to a language
that has masculine and feminine forms of the word.' Only with ade-
quate training and system-wide control over the quality of interpreters
will the eradication of these obstacles to accurate translations of judicial
proceedings be plausible.
These difficulties in interpretation cannot be eliminated. Courts
must do whatever is reasonably possible to detect errors in translation.
Courts must develop procedures for correcting these errors either at trial
or on appeal. Delegating this task to court reporters is inadequate, and
thus other methods must be adopted. In addition to having the witness
write down his statements or tape recording testimony, the court could
have a second interpreter in the courtroom to detect errors. The attorney
could assist this process by bringing his own interpreter to protect his
client's interests, or the court could appoint an additional interpreter. 32
In State v. Van Pham, 33 the court appointed several interpreters. 34
Other courts have held that the right to a second interpreter did not exist
where counsel was bilingual.135 It may appear that a second interpreter
is extraneous where counsel is bilingual, but if the attorney were to
detect an error he would be prohibited ethically from both testifying to
126. Id. at 136.
127. Id. at 132.
128. Id.
129. Piatt, supra note 82, at 8.
130. Rainof, supra note 66, at 198 (sentences in Spanish, for example, are considerably longer
than in English and the order of the noun and the qualifier are reversed in Spanish; as a result the
interpreter cannot even begin to translate the sentence until the noun is mentioned).
131. Id. at 198-99 (illustrating the problem with a translation of "cousin" from English into
Spanish, which resulted in the incorrect answer that the witness did not have a cousin when the
witness meant that she did not have a female cousin).
132. Piatt, supra note 82, at 7-8 & n.48.
133. 675 P.2d 848 (Kan. 1984).
134. Id. at 856 (appointing one interpreter for the court and one for the defendant).
135. See People v. Aranda, 230 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding defendant has no
constitutional right to an interpreter where the defense counsel is bilingual); People v. Estrada,
221 Cal. Rptr. 922, 924-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing right to a second interpreter, but not
necessarily a certified one, and also finding right is waived where defense counsel is bilingual and
defendant approves).
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the error and still continuing as counsel.1 36 Therefore, an attorney will
not inform the court of an error unless it significantly prejudices his
client's case.
E. Interpreting Tape Recorded Conversations
Another issue concerning interpretation arises when the statement
in a foreign language is not spoken in court but instead has been
recorded at a previous time, such as situations in which the out-of-court
conversation between A and B had been recorded. Courts typically
employ the same rules to the questions of whether the tape must be
played in court, whether a translated transcript must be provided, and
what remedies exist in case of alleged errors in the transcript. First,
courts agree that playing tapes in court is not an absolute right.1 37 If a
party fails to request that a tape be played, that party cannot successfully
appeal on the grounds that he was prejudiced by the jury's failure to
listen to it.138 Even if a request is made, the decision regarding whether
to allow the tape to be played is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. 1
3 9
Second, the federal courts of appeal also agree that the purpose of
the translated transcript is to aid the jury in evaluating the evidence." 40
The courts disagree on whether the transcripts can be introduced as sub-
stantive evidence. 14' Some courts believe transcripts should be intro-
duced as substantive evidence, but only to aid to the jury in determining
the real issue presented, the content, and the meaning of the tape record-
136. Piatt, supra note 82, at 11-12.
137. See United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 1189, 1194 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 254
(1992).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1194; United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 954 (1992); United States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1079 (1980).
140. Valencia, 957 F.2d at 1194 (relying on United States v. Cruz, 765 F.2d 1020, 1023 (11 th
Cir. 1985), and United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 948-49 (5th Cir. 1976), to find that the
transcript is admissible as substantive evidence and extending this holding to cases where the
transcript is admissible even when the tape itself is excluded); see United States v. Rizk, 842 F.2d
111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); United States v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975, 983 (1st
Cir. 1986) (allowing translated transcripts to be introduced without the tapes themselves where no
objection); cf. United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1201 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the
proponent of a translated transcript of a tape must introduce the testimony of a qualified witness to
authenticate and verify the translation), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); Llinas, 603 F.2d at 509
n.3, 510 (explaining the trial court properly denied the jury access to the transcript because the
appellant failed to produce the interpreter at trial to attest to the making and the accuracy of the
translation).
141. See Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d at 48-49 (holding a tape recording and not the transcript of
the tape is the evidence in the case; but citing Rengifo, 789 F.2d at 983, the court allowed an
English-speaking jury to evaluate evidence of a tape recorded conversation).
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ings.'42 It is possible that listening to the tapes will permit the jury to
observe the mood or tone of the speakers, but tapes of conversations in a
foreign language may not be helpful at all. In fact, such tapes may tempt
bilingual jurors to make their own translations and wrongfully disregard
the translator's version. 43 If a discrepancy between the tape and the
transcript does arise in a case where the tape is the evidence and the
transcripts are just an aid to the jury to understand the tape, the tape is
controlling. 1" But if the jurors understand the foreign language, they
must ignore errors and accept the translator's transcript where both
counsel have stipulated to its accuracy.' 45 This seems absurd, as the
stipulation is usually not based on the attorney's beliefs but on the reli-
ance on an interpreter to detect errors. It is unfair to allow errors to
remain in the transcripts merely because an interpreter failed to detect
the errors. Generally tapes are virtually useless to the jury because they
either cannot understand the tapes or must adhere to the transcript trans-
lation. The tapes may even confuse or mislead the jury, which provides
a basis for excluding the tapes under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 46 Therefore, listening to the tapes is more likely to prejudice
the case than to aid the jury in rendering a fair determination.
The proper procedure for the use of translated transcripts of tapes
begins with an effort by the parties to produce an "official" or stipulated
transcript.' 47 If the parties are unable to come to an agreement, each
side should introduce its own translation. To preserve the issue for
appeal, an objection to the translation must be made at trial. 4 8 In the
absence of a challenge, it is not plain error for the translator to add his
own commentary to the translation. 49 The courts are also in agreement
that the challenger must provide his own translation or at least point out
142. See United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 149 (1992)
(stating the generally accepted and preferred practice of playing the tapes and allowing the
transcripts only as an aid, but finding no abuse of discretion by allowing the transcripts to be read
and brought into the jury room because listening to the tapes is a long and cumbersome task and
the translator was cross-examined on her competence).
143. Valencia, 957 F.2d at 1194-95; see Santana v. New York City Transit Auth., 505
N.Y.S.2d 775, 777-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (demonstrating the reality of the temptation of a
bilingual juror to translate for himself).
144. Valencia, 957 F.2d at 1195; see United States v. Camargo, 908 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1990).
145. Valencia, 957 F.2d at 1195; Camargo, 908 F.2d at 183. But see Rengifo, 789 F.2d at 983.
146. FED. R. EvID. 403; Valencia, 957 F.2d at 1194-95.
147. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1491 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863
(1990); United States v. Zambrana, 864 F.2d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1988); Rengifo, 789 F.2d at 983;
United States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079 (1980).
148. United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
954 (1992); Zambrana, 864 F.2d at 497; United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1335 (7th Cir.
1988).
149. United States v. Rizk, 842 F.2d 11, 112 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988).
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the specific inaccuracies in his opponent's transcript. °5 0 If inaccuracies
exist, the translation is not prejudicial if the transcripts are found suffi-
ciently clear and accurate to assist the jury in obtaining a true picture of
what actually transpired between the parties to the conversation. 1 5 It is
widely accepted that translations never convey exactly the same idea as
was intended, and it is unrealistic to require precision.' 52 Once discrep-
ancies are pointed out in court, however, it becomes the jury's role to
evaluate the different versions and decide which is more accurate. 53
This determination is often arbitrary, because jurors usually will not
understand the language spoken on the tape and will therefore base their
determination on what "sounds" right.
Il. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY ON OUT-OF-COURT
INTERPRETATIONS OF CONVERSATIONS
A. Past and Present Theories of Admissibility
Traditionally, courts have found that testimony of a witness regard-
ing an out-of-court statement made by another person through an inter-
preter was inadmissible as hearsay because the witness understood the
statement not as originally given but only as translated by an interpreter
not then under oath. 1 The courts believed this testimony was inadmis-
sible because the witness, who only understood the statement as trans-
lated, was not testifying from personal knowledge. 55 The courts
distinguished this from in-court interpretation, which would not be
"obnoxious to the hearsay rule, because both the original witness and the
interpreter are under oath and subject to cross-examination."'' 56 This
view persevered through the middle of this century because the credibil-
ity of the interpreter and his interpretation could not be effectively
judged in the absence of the oath and there was no observation of the
150. United States v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 156 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 2288 (1992); Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d at 48; Zambrana, 864 F.2d at 497; Zambrana, 841 F.2d
at 1336; Llinas, 603 F.2d at 509.
151. Zambrana, 864 F.2d at 498; United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 791 (7th Cir. 1988),
abrogated on other grounds, sub nom. United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (1990); Zambrana,
841 F.2d at 1337.
152. E.g., Zambrana, 841 F.2d at 1337.
153. Id. at 1337; Llinas, 603 F.2d at 510.
154. Kalos v. United States, 9 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1925); People v. Petruzo, 110 P. 324, 326
(Cal. Ct. App. 1910); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ganz, 119 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d DCA
1960); State v. Fong Loon, 158 P. 233, 257 (Idaho 1916); Garcia v. State, 68 N.W.2d 151, 159
(Neb. 1955); State v. Terline, 51 A. 204, 208 (R.I. 1902); State v. Lopez, 631 P.2d 420, 422
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981). But see Meacham v. State, 33 So. 983, 983-84 (Fla. 1903);
Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355 (Mass. 1892).
155. Fong Loon, 158 P. at 237; Terline, 51 A. at 208.
156. Fong Loon, 158 P. at 237; Terline, 51 A. at 208.
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asserter's demeanor by the jury or cross-examination of the asserter.' 57
The courts recognized an exception, which provided that this type of
testimony could be admitted if the interpreter was selected by, and was
therefore the agent of, the person who made the statement and against
whom the statement was offered.' Various jurisdictions have held that
this type of testimony is admissible as a statement of a party-opponent
because the interpreter was merely acting as a medium of communica-
tion, assumed to be trustworthy.' 59 The theory employed in cases such
as Meacham v. State6° is termed the "adoption theory" because the
words of the interpreter were adopted by the parties as their own. 16 1
These cases have laid the foundation for the application of the common
law theory of agency to admit testimony on extrajudicial translations.
But the courts still have not reached a consensus on how to treat state-
ments made out-of-court with the use of an interpreter.
Recent case law strongly supports applying variations of the agency
theory to admit this type of evidence.' 62 Some courts treat the inter-
preter as a language conduit, as if the individuals were speaking directly
to each other in the same language. This theory avoids the problem of
an extra level of hearsay. 63 A few cases have relied on the Rule
803(24) hearsay exception to admit testimony of extrajudicial transla-
tions as necessary evidence possessing circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.'" Some courts have admitted this type of testimony
only if the interpreter has authenticated the translation. 65 Other courts
refuse to admit this type of testimony unless it is not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted and therefore is not hearsay at all.' 66 These
theories are not applied consistently, and the decisions often do not fol-
low the rules of hearsay or successfully address their underlying
concerns.
B. The Agency Theory
Despite past differences, 67 most federal and state courts recently
157. Ganz, 119 So. 2d at 321; Garcia, 68 N.W.2d at 159 (citing Terline, 51 A. at 208); see
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
158. Terline, 51 A. at 208.
159. Guan Lee v. United States, 198 F. 596, 601 (7th Cir. 1912); Meacham v. State, 33 So. 983
(Fla. 1903); Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355 (Mass. 1892).
160. 33 So. 983 (Fla. 1903).
161. Matlock, supra note 23, at 376-77.
162. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
167. Compare Garcia v. State, 68 N.W.2d 151, 191 (Neb. 1955) (finding a witness' testimony
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have adopted the agency theory. 168  The courts view the statements
translated by an interpreter to be the witness's own words, constituting
exempt admissions of a party under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.' 69  The courts in these cases consider the
statements hearsay but hold that the statements are admissible under the
hearsay exemption for statements made by an authorized person or
agent. The "conscious reliance" on the interpreter's translations consti-
tutes an authorization for the interpreter to become one's agent. 70
Therefore, the interpreter becomes the joint agent of the individuals rely-
ing on him, and his language presumptively becomes their own.17' This
theory is logical because the statement in question would have been
admissible against a party under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) had the parties been
capable of communicating in the same language without an inter-
preter. 72 This approach raises several issues: should the interpreter
properly considered the speaker's agent in all circumstances? Should C
on an extrajudicial statement was hearsay where the witness only understood the statement, not as
originally made, but as translated by an interpreter who was not under oath) and State v. Terline,
51 A. 204, 208 (R.I. 1902) (holding a witness is not qualified to testify to extrajudicial statements
that are only understood by the witness as interpreted) with Meacham v. State, 33 So. 983, 983-84
(Fla. 1903) (finding one who understands a conversation only as translated can testify to what was
said because the fact that the conversation was only understood through an interpreter affects the
weight, not the competency, of the evidence) and Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355, 355
(Mass. 1892) (holding a witness or a party to a conversation understood only through an
interpreter can testify on what was said as the parties adopted a mode of communication in which
they assumed the interpreter was trustworthy, making the interpreter's language presumptively
their own).
168. United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 107
(1992); United States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d
830, 859-60 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985), and cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908 (1987);
United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1983); People v. Torres, 262 Cal. Rptr.
323, 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Chao v. State, 478 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1985) (overruling Rosell v.
State, 433 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), which rejected the agency theory, disregarding
Meacham v. State, 33 So. at 983); Herrera v. State, 532 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); State v.
Felton, 412 S.E.2d 344, 355 (N.C. 1992).
169. A statement is not hearsay if
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and
is ...
(C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning
a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence
of the relationship ....
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(C), (D).
170. Daniel J. Capra, Admission by Agents, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 13, 1992, at 3.
171. Id.
172. "A statement is not hearsay if
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and
is (A) the party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
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be considered A's agent even though C is B's friend? If C was an
informant being paid by the government, is C still considered A's agent?
Many courts believe these issues are irrelevant when determining admis-
sibility, since A has adopted C as an agent by agreeing to allow C to
interpret the conversation between A and B. 17 3
When the interpreter is a co-conspirator of the defendant, courts
may find that the interpreter is the party's agent and apply Rule
801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to admit a witness's testi-
mony as statements of a co-conspirator. 174 A witness may testify to
statements made by a party and translated by an interpreter provided by
that party.' 75 Courts do not agree regarding whether the interpreter must
lay a foundation by testifying that he gave an accurate interpretation of
the party's statements. 76 If the interpreter is available at trial, his testi-
mony may be helpful. But the interpreter may be dishonest enough to
lie on the stand, under oath, if he was dishonest enough to willfully
misinterpret the out-of-court conversation.
Some courts have expanded upon the theory of agency by classify-
ing the interpreter as no more than a language conduit and admitting
testimony on extrajudicial interpretations under the same exception to
the hearsay rule that would apply if the witness and the defendant had
directly conversed in the same language. 7 7 These cases specify that the
interpreter, as merely a language conduit, does not create an additional
level of hearsay. 7 The conversation is regarded as if it were directly
between the two parties. The court still must consider the possibility of
inadvertent or willful misinterpretation.
Conflicting interests prevent the courts from reaching a definitive
and consistent answer on which interests should prevail. Although
courts commonly apply the agency theory, no agreement exists on the
issue of what the agency theory actually entails. In United States v.
Felix-Jerez,'7 9 the court suggested in dicta that it would adopt a rigid
application of the agency theory. Admissibility would require the court
to appoint or the defendant to provide an interpreter for testimony on the
173. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
174. United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 724 (2d Cir. 1991).
175. People v. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d 855, 857-58 (Iil. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 917
(I11.) and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 661 (1991).
176. See id. (requiring the interpreter testify to the accuracy of his interpretation). But see
Chao v. State, 478 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1985) (relying on Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355 (Mass.
1892) and Meacham v. State, 33 So. 983 (Fla. 1903), to admit a witness' testimony of statements
of a party as translated by an interpreter supplied by that party).
177. Lopez, 937 F.2d at 724; United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1973).
178. E.g., Koskerides, 877 F.2d at 1135.
179. 667 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
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out-of-court translation.' 80 A court appointed interpreter would assure
an unbiased interpretation, and an interpreter chosen by the party would
be considered his agent. But the same court later held that this strict
approach would create an arbitrary distinction between English and non-
English speaking individuals and between non-English speaking individ-
uals who bring their own translators and those who do not.' 8 An indi-
vidual who allows his conversation to be interpreted has adopted the
interpreter as his agent, regardless of who supplied the interpreter. It
may not always be possible to supply one's own interpreter, and it will
rarely be possible to employ a court appointed interpreter. If the conver-
sation took place before any criminal charges arose, the court could not
possibly appoint an interpreter. Similarly, if an informant is trying to
obtain incriminating evidence against the non-English speaking individ-
ual, it is unlikely this individual will make a stranger privy to his illegal
dealings.
Many cases applying the agency theory have suggested the use of a
"case by case determination," ' 2 which commences with a presumption
of agency if the interpreter had a sufficient capacity and no motive to
misrepresent existed.8 3 Courts would apply this test to establish an
indicia of reliability concerning the translation. 8 4 Factors recognized in
these cases as possibly relevant to this determination include which
party supplied the interpreter, whether the interpreter had a motive to
misrepresent, what the interpreter's qualifications and linguistic skills
are, and whether subsequent actions were consistent with the statements
as they were translated. 85 Terming this a case-by-case approach is mis-
leading, however, because agency is almost always found to exist.'" 6 In
fact, these cases generally hold that governmental provision of an inter-
preter is an insufficient basis to negate the presumption of agency with-
180. Id. at 1299, 1300 n.l.
181. United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 107 (1992) (explaining that a rigid application of the agency theory would hamper undercover
activities requiring an interpreter because the law enforcement officer may not be "in the position
to dictate which side provides an interpreter").
182. Id. at 527.
183. E.g., People v. Romero, 581 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (N.Y. 1991); see 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 801(d)(2)(C)[01] at 801-217 & n.34 (1992); 6
JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1810(2) at 376 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); 3 Wigmore, supra, § 812(4) at 283 (1976).
184. Romero, 581 N.E.2d at 1051.
185. E.g., United States v. Santana, 503 F.2d 710, 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974).
186. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985);




out other contributing circumstances.' 87 Whether the interpreter is
supplied by the government or is a government employee, he still may
act as the agent of the declarant, creating a dual agency.' 88
There have been a few cases which apply this test and find that an
agency relationship does not exist. For example, in People v.
Romero, t8 9 the Court of Appeals of New York found that the interpreter
did not act as an agent because he was a paid informant who would
benefit financially if his activities resulted in a "prosecutable case,"
which provided him with a motive to lie.' 90 Such cases create an excep-
tion that interferes with the proper procedure for determining the ques-
tion of credibility. Many believe that the interpreters' agency role is
prima facie correct, and questions of credibility only affect the weight
attributed to the evidence - not the competency of it.' 91 This belief is
supported by many recent cases. 192 Some courts, however, continue to
find these statements inadmissible. 93
In Romero, the interpreter testified to the accuracy and truth of his
out-of-court translation, but the court found the police informant still
possessed a motive to lie.' 94 This holding ignores the purpose of the
hearsay rule: to exclude evidence that is untrustworthy based on the
failure to take an oath, the jury's inability to observe the demeanor of the
declarant, and the lack of an opportunity to effectively cross-examine the
declarant. 195 In Romero, these concerns were satisfied; thus, the ques-
tion should have been one of credibility and weight determined by the
jury and not of admissibility of the testimony based on the extrajudicial
translation.196 A rule excluding evidence as hearsay when a substantial
187. Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 859-60; Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832; Felton, 412 S.E.2d at 355. But
see People v. Chin Sing, 152 N.E. 248 (N.Y. 1926).
188. Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832 (citing the RESTATEMENT SECOND OF AGENCY § 392 (1958) to
find dual agency is permitted).
189. 581 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1991).
190. Id. at 1049, 1051.
191. Meacham v. State, 33 So. 983 (Fla. 1903) (quoting Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355
(Mass. 1892)); see Henao v. State, 454 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Ganz, 199 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). But see Rosell v. State, 433 So. 2d 1260 (Fla.
1st DCA 1983) (indicating the contrary rule without discussing opposing precedent, but overruled
by Chao v. State, 478 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1985)).
192. See Chao, 478 So. 2d at 32 (citing Vose, 32 N.E. at 355). See also United States v.
Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding the inadequacy or incompleteness of the
interpreter's notes, recollections or observations would factor into the evaluation of his credibility
rather than admissibility of testimony based on the interpreter's translations).
193. Romero, 581 N.E.2d at 1051; see State v. Huynh, 742 P.2d 160, 167-68 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987) (holding agency did not exist where interpreter was related to the victim and was brought
by the officer to question the defendant).
194. Romero, 581 N.E.2d at 1051.
195. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
196. Capra, supra note 170, at 3.
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motive to lie exists would prevent witnesses who had made a deal with
the prosecution from testifying against a criminal defendant, regardless
of whether an interpreter was necessary for communication. 197 Bar-
gained-for testimony would always be found inadmissible as untrustwor-
thy based on the witness's substantial motive to lie.'98 Therefore, within
our judicial system, questions of credibility should be determined by the
trier of fact and should affect the weight and not the competence of the
evidence.
Perhaps the only situation when there should be a question of
admissibility under the agency theory is where the interpreter, C, is a
government agent and does not testify regarding the accuracy of his
translation and B is also a government agent. If C is unavailable to
testify and B is going to testify regarding A's extrajudicial admission,
understood by B only through C, then this testimony should be excluded
unless it is found to meet the criteria of hearsay exception 803(24). 199 It
could be argued that C, as a government agent, could not be A's agent.
B could have avoided this problem if he had employed an interpreter
who would have been available to testify. Yet, B may have actually
believed C would be able to testify, but C was prevented by unforeseen
circumstances. By basing admissibility on whether the interpreter testi-
fies, bargained-for testimony or governmental testimony to a defend-
ant's extrajudicial statements would often be admitted. This would
assure that non-English speaking individuals are not treated differently
regarding the admissibility of their out-of-court conversations. Conver-
sations would be admitted both against and in favor of these defendants,
if the interpreter were available to testify to the competency and accu-
racy of his translation or if the court found that hearsay exception
803(24) applied to the particular facts of the case.
C. The Application of Hearsay Exception 803(24)
Before the rise in the use of the agency theory, courts admitted
interpreted extrajudicial statements based on the necessity of interpreta-
tion for the parties to communicate and the necessity of the testimony to
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. FED. R. EvID. 803(24). Under this exception, the evidence could be admitted if the court
determines, as it could here, that the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, it is more
probative on the issue for which it is offered than any other evidence the proponent can procure
through any reasonable efforts, and the general purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
interests of justice would be served by the admission of the statement into evidence. The
statement must also be made known to adverse parties sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, as was done here. See infra notes 200-
18 and accompanying text.
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prove the case. 2 00 But many jurisdictions upheld the theory that testi-
mony recounting extrajudicial interpretations was inadmissible hear-
say.2°' Individuals should not escape justice merely because the
evidence against them is a conversation that had to be translated due to a
language barrier, when the same testimony would be admissible against
the individual had the parties understood the same language. To exclude
this type of evidence where the translation is sufficiently trustworthy
would be inequitable. The possibility of false or mistaken interpretation,
however, remains. As a result, the testimony must also possess circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness to fall within the "other excep-
tions" or catch-all hearsay exception of Rule 803(24) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.20 2 Under this exception, a translation which is tech-
nically hearsay is admissible if the court finds that the statement is being
offered as evidence of a material fact; it is more probative on the particu-
lar issue than any other reasonably procurable evidence; admission of
the statement would best serve the interests of justice and the general
purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and the proponent has made
known to the adverse parties sufficiently in advance of the proceedings
the proponent's intentions to use the statement in court.20 3
In Commonwealth v. Vose, 20' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts explained that testimony on statements understood only through
an interpreter are admissible because the parties assume the interpreter is
trustworthy by conversing through that interpreter.20 5 The court actually
classified the interpreter as the joint agent of the parties.20 6 But the
underlying basis for admitting the statement was the necessity of a mode
of communication between the parties and the trustworthiness of the
interpreter. The court explained that the parties desired to communicate
and they chose the interpreter as their mode of communication. 2 7 "[I]t
matters not whether the interpreter be selected by him or some other
person in order to make his statement original evidence. "208 The parties
are adopting a mode of communication in which they assume that the
interpreter is trustworthy. If no difference exists between the parties'
respective relations to the interpreter, they may not complain if the lan-
200. People v. Randazzio, 87 N.E. 112, 116 (N.Y. 1909).
201. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
202. State v. Letterman, 616 P.2d 505, 508-09 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), affd, 627 P.2d 484 (Or.
1981).
203. United States v. Kramer, 741 F. Supp. 893, 896 (S.D. Fla. 1990).




208. People v. Randazzio, 87 N.E. 112, 116 (N.Y. 1909).
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guage of the interpreter is taken as their own.20 9 The court found that
the interpreter becomes the parties' joint agent, but only if nothing
appears to show that the parties' respective relations to the interpreter
differ.210 This requirement implies that the interpreter is unbiased by a
personal interest. Whether the court categorizes the interpreters as
agents, language conduits, or modes of communication, the basis for
admissibility of translated statements stems from the necessity for a
medium of communication and circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. For example, if A and B could not communicate without C's aid
and C is found to be an unbiased and qualified interpreter, then the testi-
mony of B regarding A's extrajudicial statements will be admissible. In
State v. Letterman,2"' the court pointed out that the underlying basis of
the admission of testimony recounting extrajudicial interpretations is the
necessity for interpreters to facilitate communication, the necessity for
the use of evidence to prove one's case, and the circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness.21 2 As a result, this evidence should be
admissible.
Yet some courts have held contrary views. In Durbin v. Hardin,213
the Court of Appeals of Texas refused to overrule precedent in that juris-
diction dating back to 1938 and held that an interpreter's translation to a
third party was inadmissible.214 The court refused to apply the reason-
ing of Letterman to admit the testimony under rule 803(24) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. The court's refusal was based on the two
requirements common to most hearsay exceptions: necessity for use of
the evidence and circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The
Texas court, following similar logic to that applied in Letterman, sup-
ported the requirement of testimony from the interpreter concerning the
declarant's statement.21 5 The Texas court implied that the translator was
incompetent because he spoke Spanish poorly.21 6 It seemed to believe
the interpreter was not trustworthy. The court held that agency only
exists if expressly requested,217 which differs from the approach in the
other cases supporting the agency theory by finding that the implied
relationship of agency exists when the individual allows the interpreter
209. Vose, 32 N.E. at 355.
210. Id.
211. State v. Letterman, 616 P.2d 505 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 627 P.2d 484 (Or. 1981).
212. Id. See United States v. Kramer, 741 F. Supp. 893, 896 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Randazzio, 87
N.E. at 116; Vose, 32 N.E. at 355.
213. 775 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
214. Id. at 801 (refusing to overrule Gulf, Cent. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Guin, 116 S.W.2d 693
(Tex. Ct. App. 1938)).






The courts should apply a uniform test for reliability and admissi-
bility. A solution to the disparate and contradictory treatment of testi-
mony on extrajudicially translated statements is a case by case
determination of whether the interpreter was required for communica-
tion between the parties, whether the interpreter was competent and
trustworthy, and whether the parties to the conversation treated the inter-
preter as an agent by permitting the translation of their conversation.
This determination would address the concerns of the hearsay exclusion-
ary rule, while admitting evidence that would normally be admitted if
the parties could converse in the same language. It would also prevent
incompetent translations from being admitted, while eradicating the
inequitable result of excluding all testimony understood only by
translation.
D. Interpreter's Testimony to Authenticate Translations
A solution to the problem of the interpreter's possibly having a
motive to lie is to have the interpreter testify to the authenticity and
veracity of his translation.2"9 This would allow the jury to observe the
interpreter's demeanor while the interpreter was under oath. In addition,
opposing counsel could cross-examine the interpreter on his credibility
and possible motive to misinterpret. In situations where the interpreter
is available, hearsay concerns could be addressed even where a dispute
as to the interpreter's accuracy and veracity exists.
Many courts have held that a third party's testimony of extrajudi-
cial interpretations is admissible if the interpreter testifies as well.22°
The interpreter's testimony satisfies hearsay concerns by the presence of
an oath or affirmation, jury observation of demeanor, and opposing
counsel's opportunity to cross-examine. Statements made through an
interpreter at a former judicial proceeding are admissible because the
interpreter was sworn to make an accurate translation at the time.22'
When the statement was not made at a judicial proceeding, most courts
only require the interpreter to attest that he rendered an accurate and
trustworthy translation.222 Some courts require that the interpreter cor-
218. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
219. Cf. supra note 23 and accompanying text (listing the hearsay concerns).
220. People v. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d 855, 857-58 (I11. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 917
(Il1.), and cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 661 (1991); People v. DeJesus, 389 N.E.2d 260, 262 (II1. App.
Ct. 1979); People v. Chin Sing, 152 N.E.2d 248, 249 (N.Y. 1926).
221. DeJesus, 389 N.E.2d at 261.
222. Bartree, 566 N.E.2d at 857-58; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co v. Ganz, 119 So. 2d 319,
321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); Commonwealth v. Storti, 58 N.E. 1021, 1022-23 (Mass. 1901); Chin
Sing, 152 N.E. at 249; see also State v. Letterman, 616 P.2d 505 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 627
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roborate the testimony by describing the content of the statements he
translated.223 But requiring the interpreter's testimony is unfair because
this excludes testimony that would have otherwise been admissible if
not for the language barrier and the unavailability of the interpreter to
testify at trial. Further, if the interpreter willfully rendered an inaccurate
interpretation, it is possible that he would be dishonest again on the wit-
ness stand.
Some courts have held that the interpreter's testimony that he accu-
rately translated the statements made under interrogation is "not a
required predicate" to admission of an interrogating officer's testimony
of the declarant's statements. 224 These courts believe the interpreter's
testimony only affects the weight and not the admissibility of the testi-
mony of the interrogating officer.225 The reasoning of the majority of
the cases is that under the agency theory the jury determines the credibil-
ity of the interpreter and the interpretation.226 Requiring the interpreter
to authenticate his translation would be beneficial in cases where a ques-
tion of competency or a motive to misinterpret arises. But such testi-
mony should not be a prerequisite to the admission of testimony relying
upon an interpreter's translations because it may be difficult to find the
interpreter,227 often he has no reason to lie,228 and in most cases there
will not be a challenge to the accuracy of his interpretation.229 It would
be inequitable to impose such rigid requirements that would exclude evi-
dence that would be admissible in the absence of a language barrier.
Most modem courts admit testimony recounting out-of-court inter-
P.2d 484 (Or. 1981) (allowing testimony on extrajudicial translation although interpreter only
testified to the accuracy of the translation and was unable to remember the content of the
conversation); Guan Lee v. United States, 198 F. 596 (7th Cir. 1912) (allowing interpreter to
refresh his recollection from his report and admit the testimony of the listener even though the
interpreter actually only testified to the accuracy of his translation).
223. See Heskett v. United States, 58 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 643
(1932).
224. Chao v. State, 453 So. 2d 878, 880 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (The Third District Court of
Appeal of Florida stated the interpreter's testimony authenticating his translation is not necessary
to admit an interrogator's testimony recounting the declarant's translated statements. However,
the Supreme Court of Florida did not address this issue in its opinion affirming the conviction.),
aff'd, 478 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1985); see State v. Felton, 412 S.E.2d 344, 355, 355 n.l (N.C. 1992).
But see People v. John, 69 P. 1063 (Cal. 1902) (holding the admission of testimony taken through
an interpreter at a preliminary examination was erroneously admitted as hearsay, even though the
interpreter testified at trial both to the accuracy of his translation and to the content of the
statements translated).
225. Chao, 453 So. 2d at 880 n.4.
226. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
227. See United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 103 (1992).
228. United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989).
229. State v. Felton, 412 S.E.2d 344, 335 (N.C. 1992); State v. Letterman, 616 P.2d 505, 506
(Or. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 627 P.2d 484 (Or. 1981).
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pretations. They differ only on the theory or the requirements for
authentication. In the past, however, courts have held that this testimony
was only admissible to prove that the statement was made and not for
the truth of the matter asserted.2 30 No theory unique to interpreters was
created because evidence offered only to prove a statement was made
and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. 3' In
fact, the case most known for relying on this theory, United States v.
Tijerina,23 2 relied on precedent that did not involve extrajudicial inter-
pretations.233 The court stated that because the statement was only
understood through an interpreter, it was not excluded as hearsay and
only affected the weight and not the admissibility of the testimony.234
This theory only mimics the principle of hearsay and adds nothing to the
solution of the problem concerning out-of-court translations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Due process requires the right to a court-appointed interpreter for
indigent non-English speaking or linguistically disabled individuals,
regardless of whether one is requested. This class of people deserves the
same rights to a fair trial as others, but equality can only be attained by
providing special services to account for this unique predicament.
Requiring individuals participating in judicial proceedings to speak Eng-
lish creates a duty to ensure that no one is being discriminated against as
a result. The constitutional guarantees of the right to be heard, to know
the nature and cause of the accusation, to confront one's accusers, and to
waive one's rights knowingly and intelligently are meaningless and vain
if the accused is unable to understand the proceedings.
Providing an interpreter to those who need one does not give them
an advantage over English-speaking individuals but rather promotes
equality. -But only if the system provides a standardized interpreting ser-
vice to ensure accurate, word for word, simultaneous translations will
the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and the Court Interpreters Act be satisfied. Interpret-
230. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 664 (10th Cir.) (holding testimony recounting
extrajudicially translated statements was not inadmissible hearsay because it was only offered to
prove the statements were made, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 990 (1969); see also Salminen v. Ross, 185 F. 997 (C.C. Mass.) (holding the physician's
testimony concerning the examination of a patient requiring an interpreter to communicate was
not inadmissible hearsay because the testimony was only offered to show the basis of his
diagnosis and not as proof of the injured person's condition as a matter of fact), aff'd, 191 F. 504
(C.C.A 1 Mass. 1911).
231. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
232. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
233. Id. at 664.
234. Id.
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ers must be trained to avoid simplifying and explaining the proceedings
because this would unfairly provide services that are unavailable to Eng-
lish-speaking individuals. Judges, administrators, and attorneys must
also be aware that the interpreter is not a liaison between the system and
the individual requiring translation.
Further, the courts should not possess such wide discretion in deter-
mining whether appointment and use of an interpreter is necessary.
Trial judges should not be able to deprive these individuals of a fair trial
by failing to appoint an interpreter when one is necessary.
In a system that requires English to be spoken in judicial proceed-
ings, those who cannot meet this requirement should be provided with
special services to ensure they are given an equal opportunity to receive
a fair trial. These special services must be available in civil and admin-
istrative proceedings, as well as criminal trials, because principles of
fairness and due process would be otherwise violated.
Another area of the law in which the courts have ignored the rights
of this class of people concerns the admission of testimony recounting
extrajudicial interpretations. Courts tend to exclude this type of testi-
mony as hearsay because they do not address the concerns of unreliabil-
ity. Some argue that this testimony is not the same as if the parties had
directly communicated with each other because the interpreter may have
a motive to lie or may not be competent to interpret accurately. These
concerns could be addressed by having the interpreter testify to the
authenticity, veracity, and accuracy of his translation when challenged.
The jury could weigh the testimony by observing the interpreter's
demeanor while under oath and the cross-examination of the interpreter
on his credibility and possible motives. In addition, requiring the inter-
preter to authenticate his translation would be beneficial in cases where
there is a possibility of a motive to misinterpret. This, however, should
not be a prerequisite to the admission of the testimony. The interpreter
may be difficult to find and may have no reason to lie. Usually no chal-
lenge is made to the accuracy of his interpretation. Therefore, the inter-
preter should only be required to testify in cases where he was clearly
incompetent to interpret or had a possible motive to misinterpret, as in
the case of a government agent or informant.
These issues concerning the credibility of the interpreter should be
addressed by allowing the jury to determine the weight that the state-
ment should be afforded, unless the interpreter is unavailable to testify
regarding his translation. Whether one had a motive to lie is not a ques-
tion of law determined by the court but a factual issue that is decided by
the trier of fact. The court should only determine whether the interpreter
is qualified. This assures fair treatment of individuals under the consti-
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tution and applicable statutory law and fair application of the rules of
hearsay. These approaches to the issues concerning in-court interpreters
and the admissibility of testimony recounting out-of-court statements
understood only through an interpreter provide an equitable and consis-
tent treatment of individuals who cannot speak English or are linguisti-
cally disabled, granting them the same rights afforded to English-
speaking individuals.
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